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Abstract Few people realise that the idea of establishing a Black Sea Un-
ion (BSU) – a regional bloc along the Black Sea littoral – was proposed 
in the immediate aftermath of WWII. This idea was primarily developed 
and advocated by Yuriy Lypa, a Ukrainian inter-war political thinker 
(1900-1944). In his books, Lypa described the dominant cultural, political 
and economic reasons for Eastern European states to create a suprana-
tional body in the Black Sea region. He also elaborated on the principles 
of common foreign and security policy of the proposed BSU and provided 
justification for establishing free trade and customs zones. In addition to 
outlining the dominant characteristics of the BSU, this article assesses the 
viability of Lypa’s ideas, as well as illustrates the linkages between the BSU 
and European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
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The contribution which an organised and living Europe can 
bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of 
peaceful relations.
- Robert Schuman




new stage of the existence of states and a new level of Europe-
an culture in its Black Sea dimension.
        - Yuriy Lypa
Introduction
Critically evaluating research conducted on 1918-1945 political think-
ing reveals a certain inequality in focus; interest in West European in-
terwar ideologies was significantly more comprehensive than in Cen-
tral, East and South Europe and social and political scientists tended 
to neglect those sub-regions. There are at least four explanations for 
this imbalance of scholarly interest. First, social scientists considered 
it very unlikely that original thoughts could be formed in lands with 
insufficient political traditions and weak national identification.1 Sec-
ond, they explain that theories developed in occupied or dependent 
European states could hardly impact the international order during 
the interwar period. Third, they argue that interwar East European 
leaders and intellectuals were usually poorly educated and, therefore, 
could hardly generate sufficient or innovative political ideas. Not to 
mention that these leaders were preoccupied waging civil wars and 
organising revolts which left them scant time to theorise on political 
life.2 Finally, the majority of the texts that did originate from inter-
war Eastern Europe were never translated into French or English and 
therefore modern political scientists did not have the opportunity to 
evaluate them properly. And, importantly, the majority of these texts 
were stored in secret KGB archives and inaccessible for readers until 
the 1990’s. 
Yuriy Lypa, whose research will be discussed in this article, was one 
Eastern European who strove – but failed – to change the interwar 
balance of power. However, his education and future-oriented glob-
al-scale thinking makes his work noteworthy.3 As a result, this research 
will provide a necessary impetus for a re-evaluation of East European 
interwar thought and shed some light on the East European interwar 
discourse. 
Lypa was one of the few thinkers looking far beyond his time and 
foreseeing a new world order. This order, while stressing the impor-
tance of nation-state sovereignty and cultural uniqueness, was char-
acterised by the significant shift to liberal coexistence and interde-
pendence. Lypa advocated the creation of a new interstate entity in 




organisations of the time. His Black Sea States Union (BSSU) would 
have facilitated advanced trade links, established a single and free mar-
ket, launched a common foreign and security policy, and introduced 
peace between member-states. Ten years later the same priorities were 
declared by the founding fathers of the European Union (EU),4 so that 
it can be stated that the Ukrainian geo-scholar was in-sync with his 
West European counterparts even though they were more successful 
in implementing their visions while Lypa’s were supressed.
It is important to note that many of Lypa’s ideas appear naïve and 
romantic; he was inclined to ignore the existing world order and re-
place it with more desirable options. For instance, he drew up plans for 
Ukraine to shed its Soviet skin and Polish root and emerge as an inde-
pendent state in the 1940’s. But he never doubted that the USSR was 
doomed to collapse and all constituting it member-states possessed a 
moral right to pursue their national policies regardless of the Kremlin’s 
interests. These, and other romantic opinions, should be remembered 
while evaluating Lypa’s geopolitical contribution. 
This work proceeds as following: First, it presents the ideas sur-
rounding the Black Sea Space as envisioned by Lypa. This section 
evaluates Lypa’s geopolitical orientation and regional conceptualis-
ation including an introduction to his proposed Black Sea State Union 
(BSSU). This is followed by a discussion of the dynamics of the BSSU, 
including the role of the USSR (later Russia) in the formation of such a 
union. The final substantive section of this work is based on a compar-
ative assessment of the BSSU and the European Union (EU) and makes 
use of Lypa’s geopolitical thinking.Religion and Nonviolence
Studies show that nonviolent protests can build sympathy domestical-
ly and abroad by appearing less extreme than violent ones.10 However, 
perceptions that the new regimes may be more centrist can often be 
dismayed once the new governments are formed. At least with respect 
to international actors, the new regimes may not only appear extreme 
but even more extreme than their predecessors—albeit in a different 
way. Specifically, they appear religiously radical. One explanation for 
this lies with the motivations of the opposition engaged in nonvio-
lence.
The Black Sea Space
Lypa developed the idea of the BSSU in his work entitled The Destina-








argues that the Black Sea states should deploy a new geopolitical per-
spective in determining their national security identities so that they 
be redefined as key territories between North and South – not East and 
West – and use their unique positions to grow in power and ensure 
theirs and regional security. As Lypa noted, the East-to-West axis was 
the most risk-prone for those states since it entailed the abandoning of 
natural advantages and would transform the Black Sea states into co-
lonial annexes of more advanced nations. Speaking particularly about 
Ukraine, Lypa argued that the ‘North-to-South axis is the only organic 
axis for Ukrainian lands […] Ukrainian statehood requires access to the 
Black Sea and the upper parts of the Dnieper river.’5 The argument was 
supported by historical evidence that the most powerful regional ac-
tors always imposed their control over North-to-South relations. For 
instance, the kings of the Kyivan Rus filled their treasuries by taxing 
merchants who travelled from Varangians to the Greeks. This money 
allowed kings to conduct effective military campaigns and destroy al-
ternative North-to-South trade routes (f.e. in Khasaria).6 
Building on his original observations, Lypa’s second book, The Black 
Sea Doctrine (1940),  spends considerable time defining the unique 
geopolitical features of the Black Sea space—as a separate group of 
self-sufficient states which were temporarily transformed into colonies. 
These states possessed relatively weak cultural and economic relations 
to the European and Asian worlds. The Black Sea space was locked 
within itself; it was historically formed by common channels of trade 
and communication (rivers running from North to South), the com-
mon mentality and peoples’ habits, as well as by the common memory 
of huge empires and leaders who proved that strong geopolitical pow-
ers can form along the Black Sea littoral.7
To illustrate the uniqueness and self-sufficiency of this space, Lypa 
compared the Black Sea basin to a fortress with the Black Sea itself 
comprising the heart of the fortress. Its Eastern walls were constituted 
by the Caucasian states stretching up to the Caspian Sea and Volga 
River, its Western walls running along the Carpathian mountain range 
and the borders of the Balkans. The fortress had also three gates: the 
Danube, the Caspian Sea, and the Bosporus. Turkey was considered to 
be the foundation of the fortress and Ukraine its vault.8
In assessing the perception of Fortress Black Sea by world powers, 
Lypa reminds on local colonialism. For West European strategists, the 




ed these states as Russia, distinguishing them between “Small Russia,” 
“Danubian” and other fragmented and dependent territories.9 At the 
time, the world powers denied, in word and deed, the Black Sea states 
the right to become independent. Lypa agreed that such denial could 
be justified since the Black Sea region was politically disorganised and 
economically underdeveloped. However, the Lypa saw such condi-
tions as a temporary problem. To eliminate them, he drafted a political 
strategy for the Black Sea states to regain sovereignty and acquire real 
power. This focused on integration-to-unification and the creation of 
the BBSU.
Re-Administrating the Black Sea Space and the Creation of the 
BSSU
The chief reason for attempting to reconstitute the Black Sea region 
and construct the BBSU was the perceived lack of adequate deter-
rence mechanisms to counter-balance the multi-directional pressures 
mounting in the region. As Lypa was writing-up his Black Sea Doctrine, 
WWII was on and the Black Sea region under tremendous pressure. 
The USSR, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and, to a lesser some extent, 
France with Britain, were politically and economically expanding into 
the region. The USSR attempted to build railways that connected the 
Caucasus, Donbass and Central Ukraine to Moscow and redirecting 
the flow of people, goods, and resources East. Nazi Germany – after the 
annexation of Austria – attempted to deepen the Danube so that larg-
er amounts of goods could be transported from the Balkan states to 
Western Europe and vice versa. Italy aimed to control Albania, which 
was a direct threat to Turkish security while France and Britain tried 
to strengthen their positions in Bulgaria and the Caucasus, cracking 
Turkish influence in the region.10 Against this backdrop, Lypa advocat-
ed the BSSU to raise state security under conditions of external pen-
etration. 
The first step for the unification of the Black Sea states – particular-
ly Ukraine, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and the Caucasian states was 
the creation of free trade and customs zones. Lypa considered that the 
liberalisation of financial policies would unite the Black Sea states into 
one interdependent self-sufficient economy. Moreover, taking exter-
nal pressure into account, Lypa stressed that the middle of 20th century 
was the right time for the creation of the free trade and customs zones, 




The successful launching and deepening of economic interdepend-
ence was to be ensured by further industrialisation. In 1940, the Black 
Sea states were mainly agricultural though teeming with opportuni-
ties in mining and heavy industries. However, due to mismanagement, 
bribery and low education among local authorities, these states were 
unattractive for investors. To make matters worse, agricultural pro-
ductivity deteriorated year on year. 
One option to reach the standards of the more developed countries 
was to generate enough capital within the borders of the BSSU and 
investing them into the development of domestic facilities. No foreign 
direct investment was appropriate due to the concerns of economic 
security. To succeed in producing internal capital, the Black Sea states 
should return to the old – one can even say medieval – patterns of 
cooperation, which Lypa defined as artiles. Historically, artiles were 
semi-formal associations for various enterprises. Payments on job-
done were standard and based on verbal agreements. Based on the 
joint actions of families, clans, and communities with specialisations 
in a narrow field of activities, these artiles could provide the necessary 
preconditions for the economic growth of the BSSU. To illustrate the 
efficiency of proposed patterns, Lypa mentioned that several artiles 
from the 19th century were competitive in tobacco- and salt-produc-
tion, agriculture and sea trade, cargo shipping, military affairs, deliv-
ery of the post, among other activities. Lypa described this pattern of 
economic activities as the “capitalism of solidarity,” which should have 
existed and developed as an alternative to ‘individualistic Western cap-
italism and Communistic police capitalism.’12
The proposed BSSU could satisfy its demands in raw materials 
through the prudent use of available resources – mineral deposits, 
soils, rivers, and population – on the territories of the Black Sea states. 
According to Lypa’s calculations, hard coal could (have) be extracted 
in the Donbass basin (reserves estimated circa 5 bln. tonnes), crude oil 
could be pumped from Transcaucasian valleys (reserves estimated circa 
6,400 mln tonnes), manganese, copper, and iron could be excavated in 
the Central Ukraine and Southern Turkey. Also, crops, fruits, and veg-
etables could be easily cultivated on black-earth soils; this food would 
be enough to feed the entire BSSU population. All extracted or culti-
vated resources could be easily transported from one state to another 




river ports existed in the region equipped to moor and operate with 
large vessels. Rivers could also ensure the production of hydroelectric-
ity; their potential was estimated to be (approximately) 8,760,000 h.p. 
Finally, the common maritime character of people inhabiting the Black 
Sea littoral would allow them to find a common language and forge a 
strong socio-political community. As a result, sooner or later, the 140 
million BSSU residents would be in position to pursue their ambitions 
on the international level and to change the global balance of power.13
Regarding foreign policy, Lypa believed that the precondition for a 
strong Union was rooted in the political unification of the Caucasus. 
People inhabiting those terrains, dispersed and exhausted by constant 
wars, should stop their conflicts to enjoy a common welfare. Peace, 
political stability, and fruitful cooperation on the Eastern walls of 
Fortress Black Sea would assist in the sustainable development of the 
BSSU and work for the joint exploration of Iranian oil fields and fa-
cilitate trade with the Central and East Asian countries. Moreover, a 
unified Caucasus would become a secure path to the Persian Gulf and 
Indian Ocean, which was of significant importance when considering 
that the Black Sea had weak connections to the worlds’ oceans.14 Lypa 
even claimed that connections with Iran and Iraq constituted the only 
possible drawbridge of the Fortress. Lypa also advocated that an Idl-
Ural independent state should emerge at the estuary of Volga river to 
cut off Russia from access to the Caspian Sea. To succeed with this 
task, a BSSU foreign policy was to target the self-identification of the 
indigenous people in Western Asia, particularly the Kazan Tatars, Chu-
vashians, and Bashkirians, who were oppressed by the USSR.15 
One other issue in the re-administrating of the Black Sea space re-
sided in moving the centre of Orthodox Christianity from Istanbul to 
Kyiv. Lypa claimed that the capital of former Byzantium had already 
become the pillar of the Muslim cultural world and, therefore, had lost 
its value as the centre of ancient Christian tradition. Only Kyiv, blessed 
by St. Andrew at the very dawn of its existence, possessed both histor-
ic traditions and a favourable location to become the new seat of the 
ecclesiastical throne. Such a rearrangement would encourage the de-
velopment of Christian communities in the BSSU, as well as decrease 
tensions between Christians and Muslims in Turkey. 
Finally, the BSSU leaders were strongly encouraged to benefit from 
the ideological rivalry between the ‘three imperialisms’ attempting to 








oped and disorganised East European states were not in a position to 
use hard power for their protection and that many of them remained 
under occupation. Therefore, high-level diplomacy and coordination 
of foreign policies were the most applicable tools to manoeuvre be-
tween the competing regional interests in order to gain time for re-in-
dustrialisation and rearmament. 
The Lynchpin of the BSSU
Solidity within the Fortress would be assured by the mutually benefi-
cial cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey. Somewhat akin to Ger-
many and France’s role in the current EU, these states were expected to 
constitute the lynchpins of the BSSU. 
While describing Turkey, and defining its geopolitical interests, Lypa 
argued that it’s optimal develop path rested in a north-bound expan-
sion; justified by the specific allocation of mineral resources along the 
Black Sea shores (Northern Turkey),16 the intention to enter the new 
markets of East Europe and the Caucasus, and the necessity to with-
stand French, British and Italian pressure coming from the south and 
west.17 Ukraine was, according to Lypa, also pressed to the Black Sea 
by Russian assaults so that no reasonable alternatives remained except 
exploring the space to the south. Its major coal and iron ore basins, 
particularly in Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kryvyi Rig, were also located rel-
atively close to the sea. The centripetal expansion of both states would 
strengthen the connection between them and catalyse the emergence 
of the BSSU geopolitical lynchpin. This linchpin, as Yuriy Lypa advo-
cated, should have risen notwithstanding adverse circumstances and 
external obstacles. Moreover, the post-war period provided a solid 
chance for it to appear as major superpowers would be focused mainly 
on domestic recovery. 
Turkey, having experienced the reforms of Kemal Atatürk in the 
formative years of the 20th century, entered a phase of dynamic growth. 
Lypa advocated Atatürk’s rejection of Ottoman ambitions and tradi-
tions of pan-Turkism in order to build a self-sufficient state on the 
Anatolian peninsula. The separation of clerical and state power was 
necessary for this, as well as the forceful repatriation of Greeks, Ar-
menians, Kurds, and other minorities. Kemal’s policies and the trans-




people in their state and encouraged them to re-think their geopolit-
ical priorities.18 Ukraine, despite being oppressed for centuries, also 
managed to preserve its cultural uniqueness largely untouched. Lypa 
emphasised that its citizens were reluctant to adopt any kind of foreign 
ideologies even if those ideologies were introduced forcefully.19 Also, 
like the Turks, Ukrainians were less inclined to behave emotionally, 
preferring instead a rational approach to solving social issues. These 
features would grant them the right to administer the BSSU.20 Final-
ly, possessing 4/7 of the terrains and resources in the region, Ukraine 
would evolve into the engine of the Union; this state would supply the 
BSSU with crucial resources, qualified workers, and statesmen. The 
fact that Ukraine remained within the USSR – and a sliver in Poland 
– was treated by the author as a temporary hurdle, which would be 
overcome in the immediate future.
The geographic proximity of Turkey to Ukraine and the adoption of 
free, unlimited trade within the BSSU would increase revenues in both 
states. The economic justification for this could be found in the trade 
patterns of ancient times, the middle ages, and modern times.21 Also, 
Turkey was the most active sea trader with Ukraine in 1924-28 when 
Soviet Ukraine was not so rigorously controlled by Moscow’s central 
plans and could conduct a relatively independent foreign policy. Fi-
nally, in the middle of the 20th century Turkey was very interested in 
purchasing Ukrainian cotton products and machinery and Ukraine re-
quired Turkish wool and cattle.22 
Lypa also advocated that Ukraine and Turkey should forget their 
former conflicts to face the future challenges together. Being united, 
he argued, they would accumulate enough military power to ensure 
security and prosperity for the entire region. Again, examples for this 
could be found in history.23 At the beginning of the 20th century the 
Turkish government was very supportive of the idea of a Ukrainian 
state and even hosted diplomats from Kyiv between 1917-1920. Un-
fortunately, the idea of Ukrainian independence failed as nationalist 
movements lost the war of liberation in 1921. However, it did not stop 
the Turkish government from signing, on 21 January 1922, an Act of 
Friendship with Soviet Ukraine. That was one of the few international 
acts ever signed on behalf of Soviet Ukraine and, probably, the only 
one classified as a ‘priority act.’ 
The common maritime outlook shared by Ukrainians and Turks 




acterised this as one full of blind love for adventures, endeavours, and 
discoveries. This is what inspired people living on the shores of the 
Black Sea and simultaneously triggered the majority of their problems. 
Adoring heroism and perceiving the world emotionally, they typical-
ly lacked the ability to make precise calculations or to build realistic 
plans. Consequently, that often produced overestimation of power 
and defeat in conflicts with weaker, but smarter enemies. On the other 
hand, this love of heroism also ensured their cultural preservation in 
unfavourable conditions; they rarely forgot their heroes and past vic-
tories.24
The lynchpins created by Ukraine and Turkey, as Lypa saw it, was 
the crucial precondition for reducing external threats, boosting the 
economy of the BSSU, allowing it to abandon its colonial penetration, 
pacifying the conflicts in the Caucasus and Balkans, and restricting Eu-
ropean superpowers in achieving their regional ambitions.
The Role of the USSR (Russia) 
Given the content and context of Lypa’s geopolitical writings and 
their intended objectives, it is normal for readers to infer that the au-
thor was ignorant to the Nazis minor, and USSR’s major power po-
sition in the region.25 Such an assumption is patently erroneous; he 
clearly recognised Soviet Russia’s disproportionate presence and its 
ambitions. However, he considered its influence to be in long-decline. 
During the interwar period the USSR changed its economic priorities 
and started developing facilities located East, in the Asian part of the 
USSR. Notwithstanding Ukraine and the Caucasus states, new centres 
of industry were sprouting-up along the White Sea littoral and in the 
republics of Kazakhstan, Buryatia, Western and Eastern Siberia (near 
contemporary Omsk, Semey, Ulan-Ude, and other cities). If we look at 
Soviet statistical data, these new centres accounted for some 80.5% of 
all Soviet industrial output in 1939. Also, the exploration and exploita-
tion of Asian coal basins tripled the extraction of this deposit between 
1913 and 1939.26 And, the USSR launched an ambitious project to ex-
plore the basins of the Angara and Yenisei rivers in Siberia to ensure 
the production of the cheapest electric energy in the world as well as 
provide access to new coal reserves. Lypa’s argument that such a sig-
nificant economic shift would diminish Russian influence in the Black 
Sea region was therefore grounded.




timate collapse and dissolution of the USSR and Russia itself. The 
specifics of this demise are articulated in his 1941 work entitled: The 
Division of Russia. Such a collapse, Lypa contended, was based on a 
three-dimensional equation—which is relevant for our own times.
First, Lypa supposes that Imperial Russia’s territorial expansion 
– commenced under Tsar Ivan IV Vasilyvich (A.K.A. Ivan the Terri-
ble) – was a haphazard affair that left the country and its successor, 
the USSR, vulnerable and likely to fail. Instead of solving mounting, 
internal political, social and economic problems and consolidating 
the body-politik, Russian autocrats expended the nation’s wealth on 
expensive wars in a diversionary tactic to redirect public concern to 
fighting external foes. Russia, literally had to expand or die. This pol-
icy priority consequently led to dysfunctional governance structures 
over a multinational and multi-denominational empire. Russian rule 
on new lands was always supported by the rigorous enforcement of 
centrally adopted decisions, ubiquitous corruption, and imposing mil-
itary supervision. Sooner or later, Lypa predicted, such policies would 
crack; there would not be enough armed strength or political will to 
preserve the state.
Second, the nature of the Russian people was crucial. Russians were 
described by Lypa as skilful administrators who abandoned their ori-
gin and traditions to struggle for power in the heterogeneous empire.27 
They were considered pragmatic and persistent in their attempts to 
incorporate bureaucracy into every sphere of social life. Also, since 
the 18th century, the core of Russian power and spirit resided in St. Pe-
tersburg and Moscow and most Russians were unwilling to discover 
the rest of their Empire. That unwillingness led Lypa to conclude that 
Russians did not form or represent an original nation, they were pure 
administrators, nothing more; and such a mental vacuum could not 
keep the Empire together for a long time.28
Third, Russian foreign and domestic policies were regarded as ingre-
dients for national destruction. Lypa reflected that total war was, for 
Russia, the idol of imperial rule. Wars could easily be started because 
the majority of population supported it eagerly: peasants experienced 
such heavy wars that even they began to look with hope to gain new 
territories.29 After new lands were conquered, Russians often ordered 
the elimination local peculiarities which could trigger obstacles for the 
smooth running of the administration. This often entailed the elim-








people. As a result of such devastations: the fuel needed to ensure a 
history of rural-urban animosity, national distrust and local governing 
structures that could (and would) outlive the central authorities in St. 
Petersburg and later Moscow.
Simply, Lypa was certain that Russia’s long-term policy orientation 
was unsustainable and would ultimately bring about the collapse of the 
Empire. And so, conceiving of a unique Black Sea Union made sense to 
Lypa since the inevitable collapse of Russia (USSR) would create a vac-
uum and an opportunity, the states of the Black Sea littoral needed to 
build their collective consciousness and form a Union or face the trials 
of a collapsed USSR and likely penetrations from Western states indi-
vidually. So, instead of reading Lypa as a blind and naïve futurologist, 
it is more accurate to describe him as understanding that the states of 
the Black Sea littoral stood a better chance of survival in a pack than 
alone. This idea resonates to our own times as many of the region’s 
woes stem from dysfunctional cooperation and the ease of penetration 
from exogenous states.
Lypa’s BSSU and the EU: Similarities and Differences
Lypa’s conception of re-administrating the Black Sea region seemed 
to be too pioneering and innovative for the times—the interwar years, 
followed by WWII. Even today it is hard to believe that these states 
– enjoying independence for 25 years already – possess the necessary 
potential and political will to unite and become a regional superpower. 
Not to mention that the international discourse is not suitable for this. 
However, several of Lypa’s ideas about the new political priorities and 
new world order proved, over time, their relevance and a living exam-
ple, the EU, is a testament to the intersection of normative approaches 
for the sake of realistic ambitions related to peace, security and eco-
nomic prowess among former belligerent states. 
First, the intention to create the EU was derived from the concept 
of solidarity of destinies (solidarité de fait), declared by (then) French 
Prime Minister, Robert Schuman who, together with the leaders of 
the other five founding countries, concluded that dealing with the 
new common challenges required the application of new common 
strategies. Fearing the ideological and military threat coming from 
the USSR, and attempting to switch German activity from destructive 
to constructive ends, they agreed that nothing would be more sim-




their economies (1951) in order to regulate and establish transparent 
controls over the two most important war-ingredients at the time.30 
The leaders of France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and 
(West) Germany recognised that they had to begin real, fundamen-
tal, cooperation or face even greater uncertainties in the future. They 
were too weak to survive external threats on their own and too weak 
to prevent the internal revival of Nazism. And, they urgently needed 
to boost their economies to restore pre-war power and security. The 
same driving forces were defined by Lypa as crucial for the emergence 
of the BSSU. The external threat resided in the colonial ambitions of 
the Western and Eastern states to grab the Black Sea region, internal 
threats were rooted in the severe fragmentation of the states. Also, the 
only way to gain power and security was seen in the drastic moderni-
sation and industrialisation of the BSSU. 
Second, the EU’s founders advocated peaceful cooperation with-
in the Union and promoted stability along its borders. For instance, 
France and Germany were expected to abolish their historic rivalry 
and launch mutual beneficial trade.31 The North African countries 
were supposed to become closely affiliated to the Union so that they 
could be used as the resource of suppliers and transit territories. The 
Balkan states also were to become pacified to bring stability to the 
backyard of the EU. The principles of solving – actually – simmer-
ing conflicts and stabilising the situation along the borders were also 
stressed by Lypa who steadfastly believed that the Caucasian nations 
should relegate their rivalries to mere footnotes of history in order to 
enjoy the comforts of economic growth and political stability as a un-
ion. The same could be said of the historical rivalry between Turkey 
and Ukraine; Lypa simply thought it to be the leftovers of a time that 
no longer exists. Pacifying the internal space and establishing an Idl-
Ural state would result in the free access of the BSSU member-states to 
the world’s oceans, Iranian oil, and Asian markets; the Caucasian and 
Caspian states would be transformed into reliable transit and resource 
supplying partners.
Third, both the EU and the BSSU were not considered to be simply 
‘for-profit’ projects created in times of crisis. Both Unions advocated 
solid cultural foundations. The EU’s architects appealed to the com-
mon European identity shaped by Christian (Catholic and Protestant) 
humanism, Greek philosophy, and Roman law. Moreover, all European 




withstanding whether the experience of these interactions was con-
structive or destructive. Lypa, for his part, considered that all BSSU 
member-states shared a common Black Sea heritage and identity. The 
distinguishing features of this identity lay in a decidedly maritime out-
look, an emotional rather than rational perception of the world, and a 
blind love of heroism. Also, the BSSU states had a rich history to unite 
them, as well as a spiritual tradition initiated by Orthodox Christianity 
but also including Islam and Western strands of Christianity and Juda-
ism. In other words, while the EU stresses an identity of religious ho-
mogeneity and political/national heterogeneity, the BSSU was meant 
to be based on a religiously heterogeneous configuration and political 
harmonisation into a singular, homogeneous bloc. The BSSU was not 
only a project for security and prosperity, but for establishing a family 
of nations.32
There are, of course, clear discrepancies between the BSSU’s cor-
ner-stone and the guiding principles of the EU. For instance, the EU 
was founded as a Union open to the world, it was greatly dependent on 
foreign direct investments, particularly on US financial aid under the 
European Recovery Programme. Contrarily, the BSSU was intended to 
be a self-sufficient entity with no need for foreign capital which would 
only divide and then sub-divide the littoral as it had time and time 
again in the past. 
And, liberalism was recognised as the dominant ideology of the EU, 
and contrasted against Lypa’s intentions to construct the BSSU on the 
principles of nationalism.33 The revival of the artiles can be justified 
from an economic perspective; however, the nationalistic basis of the 
BSSU could possibly slow the overall development of the region, not to 
mention the possibility of new external and internal conflicts emerg-
ing as a result of competing visions of the nationalisms present in the 
region. Having described the BSSU as a free-trade and customs zone, 
Lypa did not take into account further stages of integration, such as 
launching a common currency or establishing a political union, again 
in contrast to the EU. 
Yet, Lypa’s ideas about the practical, strategic and even humanitari-
an driving forces behind the unionisation of the Black Sea littoral were 
more than a reflection of Western processes; they were a set of unique 
observations likely to have inspired Shuman and his counterparts as 
they sat, took toll of the devastations of WWII and looked for ways out 




cisely because they sought to do what people thought, and likely still 
think, cannot be done. However, if France and Germany, Germany and 
the UK can work together in a single European Union then there is no 
reason why Lypa’s own ambitions cannot be realised for peace and lat-
er union between Turkey and Ukraine seems easy compared to peace 
and union between France and Great Britain
Conclusion
Yet, for now, the weight of history has prevented the rise of the BSSU. 
To give flesh to Lypa’s conception, a strong shake-up in interstate re-
lations is needed which is very unlikely to happen within the existing 
geopolitical architecture. Romania and Bulgaria, which should consti-
tute the Western wall of Fortress Black Sea, have entered the EU and 
are bound by obligations coming from Brussels. Russia still possesses 
an efficient leverage of pressure on the Caucasus states and will not 
lessen its influence in the future as evidenced in its Crimea and East-
ern Ukrainian adventurism. The Eastern walls of Fortress Black Sea 
also have significant cracks in them. Ukraine itself remains too corrupt 
and chaotic to take the lead and invite other countries of the Black Sea 
space into a union. Turkey shows only token interest in establishing 
a trade and customs zone with its neighbouring states so it refuses to 
serve as the foundation of the Fortress. Even the weak attempts to fa-
cilitate trade between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, in 
the ranks of the GUUAM agreement, was inefficient and unproductive 
and cannot diminish Russian domination of the region. 
However, the historic value of the ideas of Lypa and the discours-
es that later surrounded these findings need to be appreciated. The 
Ukrainian thinker evoked the conception of a new-type of organisa-
tion in 1940, a decade before the EC/EU was even considered. Moreo-
ver, Lypa completed sophisticated economic calculations and conduct-
ed interdisciplinary research to prove the viability of his plans. Lypa’s 
BSSU was not without its organisation and theoretical flaws, however 
it was drawn up by only one man in the conditions of total war and po-
litical prosecution. And, it could have been significantly improved on if 
Lypa had not been brutally murdered by the NKVD in 1944.34 
Yuriy Lypa’s geopolitical conception intended to unite and trans-
form the Black Sea states into a real functioning mega-power. To 
achieve that goal he advocated the revival of North-to-South geopolit-








and the insolation from external political influences. The Black Sea 
States Union could have become a self-sufficient entity locked within 
its borders; at least, it possessed enough resources to do so. Also, the 
BSSU could have shaped interstate affairs in the region pursuing the 
policies of peace. This entailed attempts to unify the Caucasus states, 
cut Russia off from the Caspian Sea, and expel the French, Germans, 
Italians, and British from the neighbouring states. What the future 
holds in store, in this regard, remains anybody’s guess. What is certain, 
is that Lypa will be remembered for his uncompromising humanitar-
ian-nationalism that was more inclusive than exclusive and sought to 
patch centuries of distrust and animosity for a regional peace that all 
could enjoy.
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